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Abstract 
Memory can be a tricky thing. The reconstructive nature of memory can 
lead to many problems. These problems are discussed in the context of 
the conflict over recovered memories of sexual abuse. The DRM paradigm 
is introduced and used to explore false memories. The current experiment 
modifies the typical DRM experiment by introducing a condition where the 
prototype is shown. Subjects were able to distinguish between prototypes 
shown and not shown as well as any other word type, however, they were 
biased strongly towards reporting that a prototype was old. There are two 
different interpretations of these results that are discussed and possible 
avenues to clarify the issue are suggested. 
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Introduction 
People like to believe that their memories are good accounts of what 
actually occurred in their past. However, memory has many flaws. Memories 
are not simply stored and retrieved. Information is encoded and memories are 
reconstructed using previous knowledge to piece together the situation as one 
thinks it occurred (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). Memories are susceptible to much 
interference and can be lost, altered, and even created (Loftus & Hoffman, 
1989). Every new piece of information gained influences our memories of the 
past. New knowledge can change what we think occurred and how we felt 
about it (Kunda, 1999). Each time we recall a memory it affects that memory 
and the availability of it. We may remember an event based on a previous recall 
rather than the memory itself (Read & Lindsay, 2000). We may also attribute 
qualities to the memory based on lack of recall or changing of cues, cause the 
forgot-it-all-along effect (Read & Lindsay, 2000; Arnold & Lindsay, 2000). Due 
to the malleability nature of memory it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine which memories (or parts of memories) actually occurred unless 
there is another source of information.  
The understanding of the way memory works and the difficulties with taking 
memories as truly reflective of events has brought serious question to issues 
such as recovered memories of sexual abuse, the weight placed on eyewitness 
accounts (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994), and the existence of multiple personality 
disorder (Humphrey, 2002). Recovered memories of sexual abuse are 
particularly controversial and potentially damaging. It was a widely held belief 
that a huge number of women and men were abused as children but repressed 
those memories as a defence mechanism, causing problems in their current 
life. Loftus (1993) argues that this belief is based on clinical anecdotes and 
loose theory. Loftus (1997) found it was quite easy to create false memories 
with simple suggestion.  
The creation of new memories seems to be especially effective when using 
techniques such as the guided imagery that is often used in therapy to try to 
recover memories of sexual abuse (Loftus, 2003). These memories created in 
the lab are often so convincing that the participant cannot believe that the 
memories are not real once debriefed (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 
2004). Garry, Manning, Loftus, and Sherman (1996) found that the simple act 
of imagining an event increases feeling that it could occur, or has occurred in 
the past. Plausibility has a huge effect on what memories can be created in a 
person. The only memories they will accept are ones that are plausible 
(Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001). Mazzoni, Loftus, and Kirsch, (2001) 
manipulated the plausibility of the events by using fake articles, imagery, or 
simply suggestion. The therapy that recovers these memories of abuse is 
characterized by suggestion and imagery. Although it is very difficult to tell the 
implanted memories from real ones, there are some slight differences between 
the two types of memories that can be found when already knowing which 
memories are fake. Lindsay and colleges (2004) reported that when 
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participants are asked to guess which memory is false; they can correctly 
identify the memory despite feeling that it truly happened. The perceptual 
measures also appear to be stable for false memories over periods of time 
while feelings and other details increase (Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 
2002).  
There are a number of ways to study false memories to try to determine the 
nature of them and possible ways to distinguish them from genuine memories. 
One of the most common ways that false memories have been studied is 
through the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) effect. Subjects are given lists 
of words that are all associated with a prototype but the prototype itself is not 
presented. For example, if the prototype is sleep, the list would consist of the 
15 words most highly associated with sleep, presented in order from the most 
highly associated (bed) to the least highly associated (drowsy). The Deese-
Roediger-McDermott (DRM) effect refers to the high-confidence false recall or 
recognition of the prototypes. This false recall or recognition often exceeds that 
of other high associate distracters and even the correct recall or recognition of 
low-associate targets (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Read 
(1996) used the same basic procedure but included questions of confidence in 
the memories, remember/know distinction, and any unusual characteristics 
about the words. Sleep was given significantly lower confidence ratings than 
words on the lists, was more often judged as known than remembered, and 
there was no unusual characteristics reported. Read (1996) also varied the 
encoding instructions between serial learning, elaborative, and maintenance 
rehearsal. Encoding affected recall of the prototype with the highest recall 
evoked from elaborative encoding, and serial learning evoking the least recall.  
This current experiment is based upon Read's (1996) look into the more 
subtle characteristics of the false memories of sleep. The basic procedure is 
taken from Roediger and McDermott (1995). The major difference in this 
experiment is that in half of the lists the prototype is shown. This condition 
allows for signal detection analysis of discrimination for the prototype compared 
to other word types. This comparison in the past has been substituted for 
comparison of the prototype to the high associate distracters. The comparison 
of a prototype to a high distracter is fundamentally flawed, as they are 
qualitatively quite different word types. The prototype is highly related to ever 
word in the list by definition and the high associate may or may not be related 
to the other words. Another adjustment in this experiment is the use of both 
recollection and familiarity judgements in place of a remember/know judgement 
as suggested by Higham and Vokey (2004), as they are two qualitatively 
distinct processes.  
Method 
Subjects 
A total of 20 students from introduction to psychology classes participated in 
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exchange for class credit. They were each tested individually at computer 
stations.  
Materials 
Stimuli for the experiment were taken from the Appendix from Roediger and 
McDermott (1995). The first twenty word lists were used. Each list consisted of 
the prototype followed by fifteen associates of the prototype in order from most 
highly associated to the least associated. For example, sleep: bed, rest, awake, 
tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, nap, peace, yawn, 
drowsy. For each list thirteen words were presented in the study phase for a 
total of 260 words shown in the study phase. A total of one hundred words were 
presented during the test phase with five from each list.  
Procedure 
The study phase began for the participants with a message on the computer 
screen instructing them to read each word silently and try to remember as 
many words as possible as they would be tested on the words in the next 
phase. When sure the instructions were understood the experimenter clicked in 
the corner of the screen to begin the presentation of word. Each list was 
presented one word at a time in lower case in the centre of the screen for three 
seconds. The word next was shown between lists in upper case letters for 5 
seconds. Each list was presented in one of four conditions. For two conditions 
the prototype was shown with the lowest associate not shown. The other two 
conditions were the reverse with the prototype was not shown and the lowest 
associate shown. For one of the conditions with the prototype shown the 
second and fourteenth word in the list were shown. In the other condition the 
third and fifteenth word in the lists were shown. The second and third word in 
the list were used as the high associates shown and not shown, and the 
fourteenth and fifteenth words were used as the low associates shown and not 
shown. Each list that was shown contained thirteen words. When all the lists in 
the study phase had been presented the next instruction page came up.  
The next instructions explained that words were going to be shown and that 
there were five judgements to make for each word. These instructions were 
reinforced by examples given by the experimenter about the judgements that 
would be asked. These instructions were followed by a simple test to clarify that 
they fully understood the distinction between familiarity and recollection. This 
test was four examples of different ratings for familiarity and recollection that 
was meant to further emphasis that the two could be completely independent of 
each other. The test was taken from Higham and Vokey (2004). The five 
judgements the participants were asked to make for each word were whether 
the word was old (shown in the test phase) or new (not shown in the test 
phase), a recognition judgement, a familiarity judgement, where in the list the 
word had been presented (or if the word was not presented where in the list it 
would have been), and how salient the word was. Each judgement was made 
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using a slider to move between one and twelve. For the test phase five 
words from each list were presented: the prototype, the high associates shown 
and not shown, and the low associates shown and not shown. Between each 
word being tested, the word next appeared in the centre of the screen in 
uppercase letters for five seconds.  
Results  
Prototypes, high-associates, and low-associates were all significantly 
recognised, prototypes with highest recognition rates, followed by high targets, 
low targets, high distracters, and low distracters (see Figure 1). This pattern 
was the same for recall, recognition, and familiarity judgements. Prototype 
being shown during the study phase affected only the recognition of the 
prototype. False alarms to the prototype exceeded that of both high and low 
associates, replicating the DRM effect. For each judgement except serial 
position word type had a significant effect, as computed by one-way within 
subject ANOVA's (See Figure 2).  
Figure 1  
 
Signal detection analysis found no significant different in discrimination for 
any word type as calculated by A` (Proto= 0.699, HiProto= 0.786, HiNoProto= 
0.797, LoProto= 0.752, LoNoProto= 0.747). There was, however, a large 
difference in bias found with B`. Participants were extremely liberal with their 
responses to the prototypes (-0.657), compared to all other word types. 
Differences in bias were not significant between the other word types but there 
was a general pattern of becoming less liberal as the words were less 
associated with the prototype, with participants actually being bias against 
reporting the low associates as being recalled (HiProto= -0.19, HiNoProto= -
0.201, LoProto= 0.139, LoNoProto= 0.29). The results of the signal detection 
analysis can be better appreciated visually as seen in Figure 3 and 4.  
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Figure 2: ANOVA Table  
 
  
Figure 3  
 
  
Figure 4  
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Discussion 
Although old vs. new prototypes are discriminated about as well as both 
high and low associates in the DRM recognition, they differ from either 
associate in the high level of “yes” responses they attract. Signal detection 
theory has two different ways to explain these results. The first is that the recall 
of sleep is a response bias. A response bias would indicate that participants are 
simply more willing to report sleep as old due to a criterion shift. The other 
possibility is that the criterion remains constant but the distributions actually 
shift. A distribution shift would imply that the high recall of sleep is due to a 
genuine memory effect rather than a response bias. Both explanations account 
for the equal discrimination but difference in bias that was found. The 
explanation that is correct could have many implications for our understanding 
of how memory works.  
The work done with the DRM paradigm has lead to many theories of how 
memory works. One of the most simplistic and oldest theories is the implicit 
associative response concept proposed by Underwood (1965). This model is 
based on the idea that when one word such as hot is presented the word cold 
is implicitly thought of because of their association. So the more words that 
imply sleep, the more likely that one will have thought of the word sleep and the 
more likely to judge it as being old. Another theory that is quite straightforward 
is the fuzzy-trace theory. This theory explains the DRM paradigm by saying that 
the independent traces of words related to sleep increase the likelihood of the 
category sleep being old (Roediger and McDermott, 1995). This is very similar 
to the gist theory that suggests that it is the general idea of the memories that is 
maintained and the specific details are lost (Barclay, 1987).  
Collins and Loftus (1975) suggested the associative network model of 
memory, also called the parallel-distributed process (PCP) model (McClelland, 
1995). The PCP or associative network model is based on the idea that there 
are numerous interconnecting units that are activated when encoding a 
memory. When retrieving the memory the units are once again activated, 
bringing to mind other words connecting to the memory being retrieved. This 
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model would explain the DRM effect as the activation of various words that 
are connected to sleep, thereby bringing sleep to mind. The idea that sleep is 
brought to mind and attributed to being on the list, rather than just a though is 
described as a source attribution error (Garry et al., 1996; Loftus & Hoffman, 
1989; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  
The most current theory and the one that seems to explain the results from 
the largest number of studies is that of discrepancy-attribution (Higham & 
Vokey, 2000; Whittlesea, 2004; Whittlesea & Williams, 2005). Whittlesea and 
Williams (2005) suggest a causal chain for the false recognition of sleep: 1) 
expectancy 2) uncertainty 3) affirmation or surprise 4) failure to attribute 
surprise to an internal source 5) attribution to past. This process involves 
production of precepts and then evaluation of that production process 
(Whittlesea, 2004). This process is captured by the SCAPE (Selective 
Construction and Preservation of Experience) framework that is very effective 
at explaining results, but unable to predict them. Whittlesea (1997) describes 
SCAPE that emphasises the interactions between memory and the 
environment to construct a model of the event in our minds built on all different 
types of information we have access to.  
If the DRM effect were the result of a response bias many models of 
memory would have to be adjusted to be congruent with this knowledge. 
However, some models are quite compatible with a response bias, such as the 
parallel-distributed process model. But if the increased false alarms to sleep 
were due to a genuine memory various models could still be used to explain the 
effect. More research is needed to determine which explanation is responsible 
for creating these ‘false memories'. Due to the significant difference in 
familiarity, recollection, and saliency judgements for sleep it would appear that 
there really is something fundamentally different about the prototype and 
participants appear to have real memories for the word. These judgements, 
however, could be attributed to the same response bias as recognition. As we 
are aware, judgements are subjective and not always an accurate description 
of what is occurring.  
Future research could extend this design to different stimuli known to induce 
false memories and it would be extremely beneficial to find less subjective 
methods of learning about the memories of, or responses to sleep. Only when 
we are not forced to rely on participants subjective experiences can we truly 
answer the question of whether the DRM effect is a false memory or a false 
response.  
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